In recent years, a slew of bad press for Lockheed Matin's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has lead to critics calling the 5th generation jet a 'Failure'. With the jet's financial woes to newly announced "tech issues" the high ranks of the US Air Force seem to possess a lack of confidence in regards to the future of the fighter.
The F35 is on the cutting edge of multi-role fighters, incorporating many never-used technologies at once. Every groundbreaking military aircraft program has faced setbacks and so is the case with the F-35, but none have ever cost as much as the F-35, which begs the Question: Is the F-35 worth the cost or is it a "Failure" ?
Asking for the impossible
In 1993, the initial research commenced, paving the way for what we now recognize as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The objective was to find a fighter aircraft with short take-off and vertical landing capabilities, suitable for modern warfare.
Recognizing the progress of various fighter programs, the Pentagon proposed a theory: by discovering a single aircraft capable of replacing numerous outdated platforms, the acquisition cost would decrease, maintenance and operational training would become more efficient, logistical challenges associated with operating multiple aircraft in distant regions would be alleviated, and overall expenses would be reduced. However, in hindsight, these ambitions were not only idealistic but also posed the program's first significant challenge.
Lockheed Martin, the same company responsible for developing the world's first operational stealth aircraft, the F-117 Nighthawk, as well as the first operational stealth fighter, the F-22 Raptor, ultimately secured the Joint Strike Fighter contract over Boeing. This victory was attributed to Lockheed Martin's expertise in stealth technology and their impressive technological prototypes.
But money has a way of making the impossible start to look improbable… and then eventually, mundane. The Saturn V that kept Kennedy’s promise about the moon was the most complex and powerful machine ever devised by man, and by Apollo 13–just NASA’s third mission to the moon–the American people already thought the rocket’s trip through space was too boring to watch (at least until everything went wrong). Likewise, building a supersonic, stealth fighter that can hover over amphibious assault ships sounded downright crazy, that is, right up until it was boring.
“If you were to go back to the year 2000 and somebody said, ‘I can build an airplane that is stealthy and has vertical takeoff and landing capabilities and can go supersonic,’ most people in the industry would have said that’s impossible,” Tom Burbage, Lockheed’s general manager for the program from 2000 to 2013 told The New York Times. “The technology to bring all of that together into a single platform was beyond the reach of industry at that time.”
Nonetheless, the influence of financial resources has a tendency to transform the seemingly impossible into the realm of possibility, and eventually, into the mundane. The Saturn V rocket, which fulfilled Kennedy's promise of reaching the moon, stood as the most intricate and formidable creation ever devised by humankind. By the time of Apollo 13, NASA's third lunar mission, the American public had already grown apathetic towards the rocket's voyages through space, deeming them uninteresting (until an unforeseen disaster occurred). Similarly, the notion of constructing a supersonic, stealth fighter capable of hovering above amphibious assault ships initially appeared absurd, until it became unremarkable.
Making the Impossible, Possible costs lots of money
To address the diverse requirements of consolidating a minimum of five aircraft types across multiple military branches, Lockheed Martin opted to develop three distinct iterations of their groundbreaking fighter.
The F-35A, representing the most conventional multi-role fighter variant, was specifically designed for takeoff and landing on meticulously prepared runways commonly found in military installations worldwide. In contrast, the F-35B, known for its ingenious employment of a directional jet nozzle and concealed fan, possessed the capability to generate sufficient lift for vertical landing and hovering, enabling it to operate seamlessly on Marine Corps amphibious assault ships or in swiftly prepared landing zones. Lastly, the F-35C, tailored for carrier operations, featured an expanded wingspan necessary for lower-speed landings on aircraft carriers, complemented by a reinforced fuselage engineered to withstand the immense stresses encountered during carrier-based operations.
The objective was to maximize the commonalities among all three iterations, ensuring similarity in parts, production, training, and maintenance across various operational environments. However, this plan quickly proved unfeasible.
“It turns out when you combine the requirements of the three services, what you end up with is the F-35, which is an aircraft that is in many ways suboptimal for what each of the services really want,” Todd Harrison, an aerospace expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said.
Lockheed Martin's accomplished team of designers commenced their efforts with the initial iteration, the F-35A, tailored for compatibility with traditional landing strips. Upon achieving satisfaction with its design, they proceeded to tackle the intricate challenges of the F-35B, which necessitated accommodating an internal fan within the aircraft's fuselage. It swiftly became evident that replicating the design of the F-35A would not suffice. In fact, rectifying the substantial disparities required an additional 18 months and an astounding $6.2 billion solely to devise a viable solution for the F-35B—an aspect that should have been addressed prior to securing the contract.
This setback was the first of many encountered during the F-35 program's course. While certain shortcomings can be attributed to inadequate planning, it is essential to acknowledge that the program aimed to achieve unprecedented feats beyond the scope of previous fighter programs. Innovation and operational efficiency do not always progress hand in hand, and it should be emphasized that Lockheed Martin lacked significant incentives to constrain the Joint Strike Fighter program within a limited budget.
Concurrent Development
The United States was well aware that the task assigned to Lockheed Martin would not be an easy one. Throughout the history of stealth aircraft programs, from the F-117 to the present-day B-21 Raider, achieving the delicate balance between cost and capability has always been a formidable challenge. However, given the magnitude of the F-35 program, the stakes were significantly amplified. With Russia's advanced 4th generation fighter, the Su-35, and China's J-10 already airborne, coupled with their own burgeoning stealth fighter projects by the 2000s, America found itself in a precarious position. The remarkable F-22, renowned for its prowess in dogfighting, was terminated in 2011 after producing a mere 186 aircraft, leaving the F-35 as the nation's sole fighter program. This new aircraft had the immense responsibility of surpassing all existing aerial platforms and maintaining superiority for decades to come, all while commencing immediate operations.
To accomplish this, the Pentagon advocated for a strategy known as "concurrent development" or "concurrency." The concept behind concurrency was seemingly straightforward: initiate production of the new aircraft once the design was finalized, and subsequently implement changes based on testing outcomes that identified areas requiring rectification. On paper, this approach appeared to enable the fielding of highly capable fighters, pilot and maintainer training, tactic development, and the integration of the future fighter as it matured. However, in practice, it resulted in the construction of F-35s prior to comprehensive testing, followed by the expenditure of billions to address issues discovered during post-testing evaluations and rectify the earlier produced aircraft.
A series of persistent issues continued to surface, progressively worsening over time. By 2017, the severity of these problems had reached such a critical level that the Air Force contemplated abandoning the first 108 F-35A aircraft they had received (despite the staggering $21.4 billion investment) due to the exorbitant costs associated with rectification. Even as 2020 drew to a close, Lockheed Martin once again deferred full-rate production, as a significant number of issues remained unresolved.
Amidst these challenges, another financial obstacle emerged: the substantial operational expenses tied to the F-35. While a state-of-the-art, non-stealth F-15EX may incur flight costs of up to $28,000 per hour, the F-35 demands at least $44,000 per hour of operation. Furthermore, each F-35 airframe possesses a flight rating of less than one-third the total hours achievable by an F-15EX. In essence, the F-35 has proven to be prohibitively expensive both in its development phase and in its ongoing operational usage. Consequently, the Air Force is now contemplating the addition of a more cost-effective fighter to its arsenal, despite originally planning to procure over 2,000 F-35 aircraft throughout its lifespan. The reality is that the F-35's exorbitant costs render it unsuitable for certain missions.
So… the F-35 is a failure?
Not so fast. It’s easy to spiral down the acquisition rabbit hole until you start shaking your fist at the sky, and if you only read up until this point in this article or similar ones, it makes sense that you’d feel secure in lumping the F-35 in with flying aircraft carriers and pigeon-guided missiles as yet another mistake on Uncle Sam’s bar tab… but these vantage points are missing one incredibly important bit of context: The opinion of the warfighters who fly them.
In terms of responsible spending, you’ll probably only hear the F-35 program defended by Air Force officials and Lockheed Martin employees, but in terms of sheer capability, you can find lots of folks singing the F-35’s praises.
“My wingman was a brand new F-35A pilot, seven or eight flights out of training,” Col. Joshua Wood, 388th Operations Group commander, said about flying with F-35s in the Air Force’s large scale Red Flag exercise. “He gets on the radio and tells an experienced, 3,000-hour pilot in a very capable fourth-generation aircraft: ‘Hey bud, you need to turn around. You’re about to die. There’s a threat off your nose.’”
According to Wood, that same “brand new” pilot would rack up three kills against those enemy pilots in just the next hour.
These stories tend not to get as much reach as the bad news for a few important reasons. The first is that bad news sells, and folks are more likely to click on an article highlighting an expensive American failure than they are a tactical success story. The second is a bit more nuanced: While we tend to think of fighter operations in terms of scenes we’ve seen in the movie, “Top Gun,” the F-35 doesn’t simply operate in those terms.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is slower than the F-15, can’t fly as high as the long-retired F-14, carries less ordnance than an F/A-18, and wouldn’t be a match for the F-16 in an acrobatic competition. In terms of just about all of the things that we think fighters have to do, the F-35 is worse than the old jets we watched the previous generations fly in the 1970s… But there’s a good reason behind that–and it isn’t just about stealth.
Data fusion, not stealth, is the F-35's most potent weapon
Certainly, the F-35 possesses impressive capabilities such as supersonic flight, the ability to operate in heavily defended airspace, and vertical landing on helicopter carriers. However, these attributes only scratch the surface of what sets it apart. Many argue that the most significant aspect of the F-35 lies not in its capacity to evade detection or deliver munitions but rather in its capability to gather and process vast amounts of information, presenting it in a format that can be effectively utilized by human operators
Despite their bravado, fighter pilots are made out of the same guts and water as the rest of us–and that really makes their jobs a lot harder than most people realize. Not only does it take an incredible amount of physical resilience just to manage the rigors of flying in a combat environment, but it also takes a huge amount of mental bandwidth and focus.
The task of pilots operating even the most advanced 4th generation fighters involves the daunting challenge of dividing their attention among approximately 20 dials and readouts within their cockpit. This intricate juggling act must be performed while maintaining constant visual awareness of the surrounding horizon and skies, vigilantly searching for potential threats such as enemy aircraft or surface-to-air missiles, among other crucial elements demanding their attention.
Each of these dials, sensors, and screens receives data from separate streams, requiring the pilot to meticulously scan and interpret each piece of information while simultaneously monitoring the skies. The challenge lies in integrating and synthesizing this vast amount of data within the pilot's mind, even in instances when two sensors present contradictory information. Moreover, it should be noted that the effectiveness of these gauges in a dogfight scenario is not guaranteed, further complicating the pilot's decision-making process.
“In my cockpit, what I had displayed for me was what I had on my own radar and what I could hear in my headset, and that was it,” Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Dave Goldfein said in 2019. Goldfein flew the F-16 and F-117 as a pilot. “My job was to figure out mentally, in this 3-D, god’s-eye view, what was going on over hundreds of miles of battlespace.”
The F-35, with its incredibly expensive custom helmets and powerful onboard computers, takes all of that information and then adds more, gleaning data from other aircraft, ground assets, satellites, and even Navy vessels. The computers file and sort all of this information and then translate the deluge into a single, convenient trickle right in front of the pilot’s eyes. Instead of trying to manage a dozen gauges and your view of the enemy, F-35 pilots see all the pertinent info they need right in their line of sight, offering info on enemy targets, friendly assets, and mission objectives at a glance–but that’s not all this flying supercomputer can do.
“The mission commander now is taxiing out, hasn’t even taken off yet, and is already getting input from what’s happening in space and cyber,” Goldfien said. “As soon as you pilot that airplane up, it’s already starting to fuse and collect.”
The F-35's remarkable data fusion capabilities provide its pilots with an unprecedented level of situational awareness, surpassing that of any previous tactical aircraft. However, the true value of this capability is amplified when the data is shared among other aircraft and assets. The presence of a single F-35 within a formation has proven to enhance the combat effectiveness of its 4th generation wingmen significantly, as it shares a comprehensive understanding of the battlespace. Consequently, many pilots have aptly referred to the F-35 as a "quarterback in the sky," serving as a leadership platform rather than just another player on the field. Remarkably, F-35 pilots have even successfully engaged targets using weapons deployed from ground vehicles by providing real-time target information.
While the F-35's stealth capabilities receive substantial attention, it is important to acknowledge that stealth itself is a concept dating back 50 years (with ongoing relevance). On the other hand, data fusion represents the future of aerial warfare, and its significance cannot be underestimated.
The Future of the F-35 Platform
There is a distinct possibility that the U.S. Air Force may pursue the development of a "5th gen minus" fighter—an aircraft that is less expensive and possesses reduced stealth capabilities compared to the F-35, yet still offers enhanced capabilities in contested airspace when compared to the F-16. However, this does not imply that the F-35 will simply be rendered obsolete or disregarded.
Although initially hailed as the future workhorse of American and allied air power, the F-35 program has faced challenges arising from its ambitious objectives. The program delved into Lockheed Martin's extensive capabilities, leading to cost implications that strained America's already substantial defense budget. It is plausible that the envisioned fleet of 2,000 F-35s under America's banner may not materialize in the long run. Nevertheless, the true measure of the F-35's success may not solely rely on achieving the intended quantity but rather on its overall performance and impact.
In 2019, Lockheed Martin faced criticism when they informed Japan that they could develop a new stealth fighter that combines the capabilities of the F-35 and F-22 at a lower cost. This acknowledgment seemingly underscored the fiscal concerns surrounding the F-35 program. However, there is an alternative perspective to consider: The first iteration of any technology tends to be more expensive than subsequent versions. Over time, advanced technologies become more commonplace and affordable, paving the way for new and costly advancements. This pattern is inherent to the realm of warfare and technology.
Future fighters, such as the next-generation air dominance (NGAD) platforms, will benefit from the valuable lessons and costly mistakes made during the development of the F-35. Insights gained in areas like avionics, secure networking, and operations in contested airspace will be instrumental in shaping future aircraft. While these advancements offset the financial challenges faced during the F-35 acquisition over the past 14 years, it does not negate the fact that the F-35 program incurred significant costs. The F-35 may possess revolutionary technology, but cost-effectiveness cannot be solely measured by capability alone.
If one's judgment of the F-35 is solely derived from financial figures and statistics on paper, it might be concluded that it is a failure. However, it is important to remember that the F-35 was not designed to operate solely on paper. Its purpose was to provide American warfighters with a decisive advantage over adversaries, and according to the pilots who fly it, it has achieved that objective.
Hence, the evaluation of the F-35 as an acquisition failure or a tactical success is a complex matter. In truth, it encompasses both aspects.
By Aman Sribrahma
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